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Shai Gar
6 Mar 2005, 07:25 AM
1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
2.141 A picture is a fact.
2.172 A picture cannot depict its pictorial form: it displays it.
2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
3.3 Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.
3.332 No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself.
4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
4.001 The totality of propositions is language.
4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.
4.0031 All philosophy is a 'critique of language'. The apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science
4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
4.461 Propositions show what they say; tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
4.464 A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible.
5.3 All propositions are results of truth-operations on elementary propositions.
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
5.621 The world and life are one.
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)
6.13 Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental.
6.2 Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions.
6.21 A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world.
6.431 At death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.
6.4311 Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.
6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up it.)
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.


i almost agree completely.

anyone disagree and for what reasons?

Hypnos
6 Mar 2005, 08:24 AM
What is a "thought," and why can't math express them?

Are mathematical statements "pseudo-propositions" because they are true, not merely possibly true?

What the hell is 6.54 talking about?

Shai Gar
6 Mar 2005, 10:28 AM
i think that might have been an idle thought that found its way in. like in ponders list on how roundworld works, item number 7 was "it's so depressing". but it might be something to think about.

and maths can express all thoughts. but todays understanding of mathematics can not yet do it. once we can understand our thoughts on a mathematical level we will be that much closer to AI

cuspuser
7 Mar 2005, 12:14 AM
interestingly enough this is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which you are quoting from, later in his life (as you probably know) he wrote the philosophical investigations which was published after his death which was a philosophical stance in direct opposition to the tractatus, more specifically against the picture theory of language.

So Wittgenstein disagrees, replacing his stance with the notion of language games, tho he states that this view could indeed show a simply language game but that it definately doesn't show everything we currently we do with language.

tho i think like myself, most people have a soft spot for the picture theory of language - whether or not its right, it definately seems intuitive (for now)