Of science and philosophy, a bit

[Wilde Mutton]

This might have been done already, in which case reference to the thread(s) in question would be greatly appreciated. Anyhow, I was reminded today of E.O.Wilson´s book "Consilience, The Unity of Knowledge", in particular the bit where Wilson said scientists should take it upon themselves to slowly but surely convert all philosophy into science. Also:
"Once intellectual inquiry leads to the articulation of a standard theory together with an accepted method of experimental investigation, then, in all probability, the problem will no longer be considered part of philosophy. It will, instead, be attributed to some independent discipline. Thus, philosophy loses some of its subject matter through its own success." - Cornman, Lehrer, Pappas: "Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction"
The question becomes if the proposition of convertion and success is feasible when it comes to sciences, separate fields of inquiry with their separate methodology, leaving out the areas of inquiry which by their nature are either too general and fundamental to ever have their own sets of theories and methods (such as epistemology) or which are at a transitional stage from philosophy into science (such as linguistics, particularly semantics). In your opinion, CAN SCIENCE EVER BE COMPLETELY SEPARATED FROM PHILOSOPHY AND THE BREAKING OF PARADIGMS? MUST ONE ALWAYS RETURN TO THE ROOTS AND ASK FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS TO MOVE FORWARD? IS "SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS" AN OXYMORON, AND NEVER TO BE DEEMED FINAL? Any other questions which you deem relevant are also worth asking, even worth an effort to answer. These were just from the top of my head...Please let me know your thoughts on this matter.

[nonsequitur]

I'm currently taking a course in the History and Philosophy of Science. I guess the answer to whether science can ever be completely be separated from philosophy etc. is in the origins of Science, and the definitions of both terms. According to Thomas Kuhn's paper "The Scientific Revolutions", it was proposed that science was simply a process by which people gathered data, and formed a thesis, before undergoing a paradigm shift (Gestalt Switch). This was called a "scientific revolution", and so, the progress of science was basically one revolution after another. However, he also insisted on a positivist stance, that is, science and the information, the "truth" accumulated through science constituted progress, towards the one larger, unified theory. Kuhn's paper has revolutionised (pardon the pun) science social studies, and perhaps you should check it out.
in fact, the origins of science is something that frequently causes me wonder. It emerged from post-restoration England, through the writings of Boyle, who invented "science" as a means of looking at the world. This was achieved through 3 technologies (from Shapin and Schaffer's paper), the material technologies (his air pump), social technologies (invention of witnessing as a means of verification and production of matters of fact) and literary technologies (invention of style of scientific writing). all in all, science can be considered to be a form of merger of empiricist philosophy and rational politics. Therefore, in Bruno Latour's paper, it was proposed that modern society is formed on the basis of assumption that science and politics are two totally different things that should not be allowed to affect each other (from "We have never been modern") which was based on Boyle's empiricist philosophy and Hobbe's rational philosophy. This is something that does not exist in reality. So, to answer your question, i do not think that science can ever be completely separated from philosophy, especially if it is to be useful in answering the huge question of how to live a proper life. Also, since science has foundations in philsophy, and is based in philosophy - in essence, it is a branch of philosophy, as politics similarly is - it is impossible to unwind all three.
With regards to your question about "scientific progress", I guess you have to examine your definition of "progress". Since progress is a value-based judgment, it is impossible to say that science leads to progress objectively. Using Kuhn's argument, of course, it could be argued that everything is basically relativist, but I don't see any practical applications of that - it is merely theoretical, and, to my mind, extraordinarily depressing. ;)

[Lee]

What isn't part of philosophy?

[nonsequitur]

;) that's true. so technically everything cannot be unwound nor studied in isolation from anything else.

[Johnny]

;) that's true. so technically everything cannot be unwound nor studied in isolation from anything else.Sure it can...in theory...LOL

[kuranes]

Anybody ever get in to philosopher/scientist Rupert Sheldrake? The jury is still out on him, but he has some interesting thoughts and evidence. I took notes on one of his books a couple years ago. One of those INTP activities, thinking I would weave it in to something else later. I am winding, more than I am UNwinding, generally.

[Wilde Mutton]

I had already given up on this thread... :)

First off, thanks to everyone who has answered thus far.
Secondly, my definition of the progress of science is not the technology and/or the number of theories it yields, but a measurement of how far science can go without philosophy. My guess is that the two will never be separated. Unlike Wilson, I believe that such steps will irrevocably hinder whatever power science has as an explanatory force (science as an explanatory force seems to me to be nothing but a movement of stagnation). There can always be valid criticism on the validity of the foundations of science. Without philosophy science wouldn´t be science but a religion. - In my heart of hearts I have no faith on something which has its roots on something as intellectually honest as the basically agnostic nature of philosophy but sees its strength to lie in the weeding out of that agnosticism. Science seems like a game. One has certain rules not affecting the true nature of the system from which it stemmed and those rules, when carefully articulated and understood as settings rather than truths in themselves, make science an intriguing game of arguments. The fact that these settings are being treated as immutable blurs the purpose of the game and twists our view on the results we get. As a game of arguments the conclusions we have gotten by "playing science" need to be seen as distorted by the settings. This gameplaying would then be that "unwinding and studying in isolation".

[Wilde Mutton]

Anybody ever get in to philosopher/scientist Rupert Sheldrake? The jury is still out on him, but he has some interesting thoughts and evidence.


According to Thomas Kuhn's paper "The Scientific Revolutions", it was proposed that science was simply a process by which people gathered data, and formed a thesis, before undergoing a paradigm shift (Gestalt Switch). This was called a "scientific revolution", and so, the progress of science was basically one revolution after another. However, he also insisted on a positivist stance, that is, science and the information, the "truth" accumulated through science constituted progress, towards the one larger, unified theory. Kuhn's paper has revolutionised (pardon the pun) science social studies, and perhaps you should check it out.

Looks like I have my work cut out for me...Never was good at reading when suggested to, though. I´ll try and look into those. Thankyou :)

[nonsequitur]

Since i've no idea how to quote, i'll just have to do this.. *embarassed look*

"Secondly, my definition of the progress of science is not the technology and/or the number of theories it yields, but a measurement of how far science can go without philosophy. My guess is that the two will never be separated. Unlike Wilson, I believe that such steps will irrevocably hinder whatever power science has as an explanatory force (science as an explanatory force seems to me to be nothing but a movement of stagnation). There can always be valid criticism on the validity of the foundations of science. Without philosophy science wouldn´t be science but a religion. - In my heart of hearts I have no faith on something which has its roots on something as intellectually honest as the basically agnostic nature of philosophy but sees its strength to lie in the weeding out of that agnosticism. "

Yes, those are valid criticisms about the foundations of science. After all, science was formed due to a number of social, philosophical and political factors during 17th century post-restoration England. In fact, much of what science is today is formed on the basis of Boyle's empiricist views, and Hobbe's Rationalist ones. This dualistic-type of view still dominates today, as science is seen as separate from politics, and neither should affect each other, when in fact, both are extensions of philosophy, intrinsically bound together, and thus, affecting each other.

With regards to your statement about science attempting to "weed agnosticism out of its philosophical basis", i think that stems from a misunderstanding of what science is about. Science is never a work that is done. Although there are people - the positivists - who believe in a unified theory that is nothing more an an aesthetically pleasing idea, the reasonable among the scientists acknowledge that this is nothing more than a construct. But hey, if the construct works, and improves our lives, why not enjoy it? The thing is, what started out in empiricist principles - Hume-like "I can only observe a fact, I cannot explain why it is so" has slowly evolved into some scientists' trumpeting of their discoveries as "facts". Of course, it is necessary to adopt some principles as "matters of fact"; assumptions, in order to move on in a particular direction. However, if an anomaly is discovered, theories can be further refined. Science is basically, above all, a means of explaining the world - in a way that fits the data. I wouldn't say that I can't place my faith in science, because I do believe in the experimental, research methodology, however, I acknowledge that science is in itself framed by the scientists and their assumptions, education and methods.


"Science seems like a game. One has certain rules not affecting the true nature of the system from which it stemmed and those rules, when carefully articulated and understood as settings rather than truths in themselves, make science an intriguing game of arguments. The fact that these settings are being treated as immutable blurs the purpose of the game and twists our view on the results we get. As a game of arguments the conclusions we have gotten by "playing science" need to be seen as distorted by the settings. This gameplaying would then be that "unwinding and studying in isolation"."

Basically, the points that you've brought up were also brought up by Hobbes! (Who was studied more for his political beliefs than for his scientific ones) Yes, the framing, or as you put it, the "settings" are important. Hence, I do agree with you that it is important not to simply adopt science as a "matter of fact", but to see the framings and assumptions inherent in the theories and the equipment available. Hence the many scientific arguments and discussions about the means of conducting the experiment, what is considered "good science" and "good method" etc. That is one thing that I particularly like about science - it doesn't take anything for granted, and everything is up for evaluation. Perhaps that is where it may differ from religion (ref. previous paragraph). In religion, it is taken that there is "one truth", and that it is possible to obtain that truth. However, most scientists do not believe that (except for the previously stated positivists), and their scepticism is what forms the foundations of science.

[Wilde Mutton]

Having never read Hobbes (I´m not as well-read as I would like, and I blame Wittgenstein [that comment about reading Aristotle has never failed to stick with me]), I am particularly pleased about your comment towards the end. You must forgive me if I have come across as somewhat against science. The truth is I am very infatuated with it, and breaking scientific theories into frames and assumptions and playing with them, never knowing what´s around the corner, is something I enjoy immensely. However, most of my science teachers so far have been somewhat positivistic. I take it you can guess what my attitude towards their attitude is like. Not only that, but they have lacked intellectual integrity...Hence the venting. I am certain SCIENCE is open-ended, but I´m not too sure about the scientists.

[PriorityLove]

I acknowledge that I could be wrong about the following:
I believe that science is one way of trying to understand the world in which we live as accurately as possible. As far as the reason for obtaining/application of that knowledge, that is not necessarily science. The idea that everything in scientific discoveries are always up for skepticism and reevaluation and the idea that there is only "one truth" which can be found are not completely incompatible with each other. If there is an endless amount of accurate knowledge or "truth" then the defenition of progress in science is not that we are getting closer to the goal of acquiring all accurate knowledge or truth, but just to acquire more of it. I believe that the reason scientists are so skeptical is because there is only one truth. That way if something was thought to be true, but later was proved false you would not be stuck with something that is not truth. If there is not only one truth, then why question what we think we know now?

[Hypnos]

As a scientist, I can say that any divorce of philosophy from science is perilous. Positivism is easy w/o philosophical criticism, because there is some "essence" in nature that we are approaching by science's continuing march -- the arrogant might presume that their own aesthetic projections are reality.

[Wilde Mutton]

On to the question also dealt by Wilson in the same book with, at least in my mind, a somewhat overly optimistic (positivistic?) attitude. The humanities are not often seen as sciences but differ from philosophy in the same way by having their separate methodologies and developed paradigms. (The degree of their "development" is a matter of open debate. Discuss if you will. I´d be interested in your opinions on this one, and it does appear to be a topic arising no small amount of controversy.) Wilson is eager to turn all philosophy into science, and he does mean ALL philosophy, meaning that the humanities need to be developed to a more "accurate" form. Hermeneutics is to be abandoned and one must bring into humanities that "rigour" and setting-building as with natural sciences. Coherence, concilience is what he says he is after by such actions; a question should, according to him, be dealt with so that all that can be attained from it is attained via "the scientific approach" and what is attained is interpreted with the same mindset as results are treated in the field of natural sciences. The whole idea reeks of an "aesthetic projection"... I don´t know if I have explained it adequately though...Any thoughts?

[Hypnos]

What would it even mean to apply scientific principles to something like literature?

* Science is about building models -- theories of how nature works.

* Nature is assumed to be "smooth." When you can repeat results on a statistical, objective basis, you can make the statement that the theory in question is true.

* Mathematical considerations of models can suggest new things about nature, but these theoretical extensions must be tested so as to know the limits of the theory.

The central problem with consilience is rigor. For example, building up from population genomics to economics begs a massive sequence of experiments that last hundreds of years and are probably unethical. There are no shortcuts in reductionism.

In the case of hermeunetics, how does on establish objectivity? Consensus, I suppose. And, can literary theories (e.g., New Criticism, deconstructionism) predict new phenomena in "the wild?"

PS: The negative comments on the book on Amazon are quite good:

link (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/067976867X/ref%3Dpd%5Fsl%5Faw%5Falx-jeb-7-1%5Fbook%5F2538778%5F1/002-1438143-0558446)

[Wilde Mutton]

I particularly agreed with this one:


This context, is where he drearily fails. Why? Because he openly REFUSES to recognize the philosophical context. He admittedly (in the chapter 2 I believe) proclaims all can be known by science and its monological studies, and anything that can't be examined in such a manner simply doesn't exist. From such a perspective the author remains crystalized in 1700 spouting cheers for Aristotle and Cartesian ideologies, completely disregarding over 200 years of post-modern and integrative thought. -- I bought this book for the sake it pursued a "Unity of Knowledge," and I am deeply interested in integrative thinking and philosophy. I've read many books on the subject, and this one comes so short, and covers such a small territory of the current intellectual trends, that it's almost insulting.

However, he unknowingly makes one ask interesting questions, mainly about the validity of some of his most pivotal claims.

[Nivegna]

As a scientist, I can say that any divorce of philosophy from science is perilous.

Agreed

[Nivegna]

What would it even mean to apply scientific principles to something like literature?

* Science is about building models -- theories of how nature works.

* Nature is assumed to be "smooth." When you can repeat results on a statistical, objective basis, you can make the statement that the theory in question is true.

* Mathematical considerations of models can suggest new things about nature, but these theoretical extensions must be tested so as to know the limits of the theory.

The central problem with consilience is rigor. For example, building up from population genomics to economics begs a massive sequence of experiments that last hundreds of years and are probably unethical. There are no shortcuts in reductionism.

In the case of hermeunetics, how does on establish objectivity? Consensus, I suppose. And, can literary theories (e.g., New Criticism, deconstructionism) predict new phenomena in "the wild?"

PS: The negative comments on the book on Amazon are quite good:

link (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/067976867X/ref%3Dpd%5Fsl%5Faw%5Falx-jeb-7-1%5Fbook%5F2538778%5F1/002-1438143-0558446)


_________________________________________

[Nivegna]

This is a silly question because there cannot be a disjunction :


Science can't be divorced from Philosophy. Most if not all scientific modes are inherently Lockeian, Kantian and Leibnitzian by nature as a matter of fact. Not only the hard sciences by the soft ones as well. Perhaps Wittgenstein at first attempted to change this in his beginning efforts. After throwing away his so called "ladder" one could view science in a more crystal clear method (along with life). That was his intention probably. To solve the problems of philosophy for a more focused view in the science realm. I won't say whether he failed or not only that he claimed to have perhaps failed with "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" with his pessimism later in his life. "Philosophical Investigations" by Wittgenstein is too anti-systematic to be usefull for science; yet is still conducive to genuine philosophical understanding of traditional problems. Also, helpfull perhaps in AI (Artificial Intelligence), computer programming and other branches like Mathematics where symbols are important. However, that helpfullness would not come from a systematic computer science approach to a situation. Although, the highly original ideas (e.g new symbols and linguistic representation) that sprang from such "helpfullness" could be integrated within a systematic frame.


Lockeian --- empirical, agreement on observation or data, truth is experiential and does not rest on any theoretical considerations.

Leibnitzian --- formal model, theoretical explaination, truth is analytic and does not rest on raw data of an external world.

Kantian -- (The Noumenal and Phenomenal realms) theoretical model and empirical data compliment each other and are inseperable, truth is a synthesis, multiple models provide synergism (for example, particle and wave theories in physics).

Science is inherently Lockeian, Leibnitzian and Kantian because of it's reliance on data and models. Science must collect data and use models, therefore, it is impossible to seperate philosophy from science.

__ :duel:

[illusivemind]

The question provides information about the motivations of the questioner more than anything else.

Why would you seek to divorce science from philosophy? Because you regard philosophy as incapable of eliciting concrete answers to any pertinent questions, and science as fully qualified in this regard. Thus, this is really the sort of question only a logical positivist would ask. And yet according to very thesis of logical postivism itself it is a question that is meaningless nonsense.

A willingness to doubt long-held views and challenge the most primary of assumptions is well within the purview of philosophy and is essential to any good science.